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Where's the Consumer Harm?
The BOTS Act:
A Fruitless Boogeyman Hunt
ABSTRACT

Historically, the secondary-ticket market for sporting events,
concerts, and the like entailed hollering scalpers perched outside of
venues. Though this practice has not been entirely extinguished, the
internet has largely moved the secondary-ticket market online to
websites like StubHub, the largestplayer in this arena. Instead of yelling
loudest or finding the best real estate outside a stadium from which to
perch, the modern ticket scalper competes most effectively in the
secondary-ticket market by finding ways to access primary tickets online.
By using ticket "bots," programs designed to autofill customer
information and solve CAPTCHA prompts, modern scalpers can quickly
purchase large quantities of tickets from primary-market sites like
Ticketmaster. The goal of the modern scalper is the same as the goal of
the hollering scalper of the past: to resell these tickets for a marked-up
price.
States have responded to modern bots-based ticket resales
with the whole gamut of legislation, ranging from no regulation, to
disallowing online ticket bots, to wholesalers banning ticket resale
altogether. Congress upended states' disparateapproachesin 2016 with
the enactment of the Better Online Ticket Sales (BOTS) Act, which
effectively prohibits the use of bots for online ticket resale and charges
the FederalTrade Commission (FTC) with its enforcement. The problem,
however, is that the BOTS Act attacks a nonexistent boogeyman. Neither
ticket bots nor the modern scalper creates marked-up ticket prices in the
secondary market; consumer demand does. Moreover, consumers have
no right to attain underpriced tickets. On the flip side, performers and
sports teams have every right to set prices as they see fit. Every day, the
FTC prosecutes bad actors who defraud the elderly of their savings,
deliberately fool consumers into believing falsehoods about a product
(like sham dietary supplements), and trick people into believing
celebrities endorse scam-centered products. These are legitimate
consumer harms. Purchasing tickets-with full information and
disclosures-on the secondary market at prices higher than one wishes
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to pay is not the sort of fraudulent activity that the FTC should be forced
to police as "consumerprotection. "Accordingly, this Note argues that the
BOTS Act should be repealed or, at a minimum, removed from the FTC's
consumer-protection apparatus.
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Historically, ticket scalpers lurked outside sporting and concert
venues and shouted "Get tickets here!" or "Selling tickets?" to passersby
to facilitate secondary-market transactions.' The historical scalper
garnered a competitive advantage by pinpointing the best part of the
stadium parking lot in which to perch or by utilizing in-person charisma
to engender greater confidence in the authenticity of the tickets. In the
modern scalping world, however, the internet's secondary-market
preeminence has largely displaced the in-person scalpers as mere
artifacts of childhood nostalgia. 2
The modern scalper is the faceless Ticketmaster shopper who
sells his tickets in an online secondary market like StubHub. 3 He
derives competitive advantage by employing the best computer
algorithm, internet robot ("bot"), or software that can bypass security
measures, autofill customer data, like one's credit card number
and address, and snatch up the primary market's underpriced
tickets as quickly as possible before unloading them on StubHub.
Primary-market sellers like Ticketmaster cap individuals' ticket
quantities and require consumers to solve CAPTCHAS that are
supposed to distinguish real human buyers from computer programs.5
But these barriers pose no problem for the modern scalper, whose
computer algorithm, bot, or computer program immediately sidesteps
Ticketmaster's restrictions.
From the ordinary consumer's perspective, what are the effects
of scalper activities' migration to the internet? If primary-market
tickets are underpriced-as they typically are 7-then the advent of
1.
See Paul Crosby & Jordi McKenzie, The Economics of Ticket Scalping, CONVERSATION
(Sept. 10, 2017, 3:44 PM), http://theconversation.com/the-economics-of-ticket-scalping-83434
[https://perma.cc/W3YE-J95X]; Michelle Kaminsky, Who Needs Tickets? Is Ticket Scalping Legal?,
LEGALZOOM (Dec. 2009), https://www.legalzoom.com/articles/who-needs-tickets-is-ticket-scalpinglegal [https://perma.cc/MJ95-ED9V].
2.
Carter Maness, The Hard Life of an Old School Scalper in the Age of StubHub,
GOTHAMIST (Feb. 10, 2017, 11:20 AM), https://gothamist.com/arts-entertainment/the-hard-life-ofan-old-school-scalper-in-the-age-of-stubhub [https://perma.cc/MZZ2-3NKJ].
Id.
3.
4.
Jim Zarroli, Can't Buy a Ticket to that Concert You Want to See? Blame Bots, NPR:
ALL THINGS CONSIDERED (Jan. 28, 2016, 1:38 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/20 16/01/28/464708 137/cant-buy-a-ticket-to-that-concert-you-want-to-see-blame-bots
[https://perma.cc/568E-KDMB].
5.
Sammi Elefant, Beyond the Bots: Ticked-Off Over Ticket Prices or the Eternal
Scamnation?, 25 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 14, 14 n.109 (2018).
Id. at 14.
6.
Eric Schroeder et al., A Brief Overview on Ticket Scalping Laws, Secondary Ticket
7.
Markets, and the StubHub Effect, 30 ENT. & SPORTS LAW., Nov. 2012, at 1, 26.

954

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 22:4:951

algorithmic scalpers means that fewer ordinary consumers have the
ability to purchase tickets in the primary market.8 For the most popular
sporting and entertainment events, scalpers use bots to buy upwards of
half of the posted tickets.9 At Broadway's popular Hamilton show, for
example, scalpers purchased more than 40 percent of the tickets by way
of ticket bots. 10 As a result, ordinary consumers are, presumably,1 1 less
likely to access tickets on the primary market. 12 But because ticket
prices in the primary market are related to ticket prices in the
secondary market, the price effects of bots are unclear. Nonetheless,
Congress enacted the Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016 (the "BOTS
Act") 13 to try to create "reasonable" ticket prices by way of outlawing
bots in the ticket-purchasing process.1 4 This Note describes the
BOTS Act and argues that (a) the BOTS Act is a solution without a
problem, because no legitimate consumer harm exists with respect to
secondary-ticket sales; and (b) if such harm were cognizable, then the
FTC should abdicate enforcement authority of the BOTS Act.
I. BACKGROUND: NON-BOTS ACT TACTICS TO THWART SCALPERS

Sports teams, musicians, performers, Ticketmaster, and
government actors have all deployed different mechanisms to try to
thwart computerized ticket purchasers and to minimize scalper surplus
in the secondary market. Broadly construed, these efforts center on two
principal routes: private enforcement and government enforcement.

8.
U.S. GOVT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-347, EVENT TICKET SALES: MARKET
CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ISSUES 19 (2018), https://www.gao.gov/as-

sets/700/691247.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH8P-K9MY] [hereinafter EVENT TICKET SALES].
9.
VIEW:

OFFICE OF N.Y. STATE ATT'Y GEN. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN,
WHAT'S
BLOCKING NEW
YORKERS
FROM GETTING TICKETS
4,

OBSTRUCTED
14

(2016),

https://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/TicketSalesReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LP3G-KM5H]
[hereinafter
OBSTRUCTED VIEW]; Ben Sisario, Congress Moves to Curb Ticket Scalping, Banning Bots Used
Online, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/08/business/media/ticketscalping-bots-act.html [https://perma.cc/EQ2A-GBHF].
10.
Rebecca Beitsch, Despite Bans, Ticket-Buying Bots Still Snag the Best Seats, PEW
CHARITABLE TR. (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/20 18/02/02/despite-bans-ticketbuying-bots-still-snag-the-best-seats
[https://perma.cc/D8LL9SSA].
11.
Studies often decry the high percentage of tickets sold on the secondary market in
today's bots-filled world, but there is no mention of the percentage of tickets sold in the secondary
market in the pre-internet, pre-bots-filled world.
12.
Beitsch, supra note 10.
13.
Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274, 130 Stat. 1401.
14.
S. REP. NO. 114-391, at 3-4 (2016).
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A. Private Enforcement
Anything outside the government's regulatory apparatus can be
viewed as private enforcement in the ticket-sales industry. Performers,
sports teams, and primary-ticket market sites like Ticketmaster aim to
curtail secondary-market arbitrage opportunities for a few reasons.
First, all things being equal, these entities would prefer to actualize
surplus themselves instead of allowing algorithmic scalpers to squeeze
out profits that exist outside the primary market.1 5 Next, sports teams
and artists prefer to sell out tickets to their events in order to create a
livelier environment and to increase the volume of merchandise and
food sales during events. 16 For food and merchandise sales, a performer
might wish to forgo ticket profits in lieu of greater profits at the
stadium.1 7 Finally, performers and sports teams might desire that end
consumers pay lower prices for tickets so that a broader swath of fans
can attend. 18

Based on these disparate justifications, private entities
have undertaken different approaches to counteract scalper
surplus: (1) website security, (2) in-person sales, (3) rewards systems,
(4) photo identification, (5) primary-market price changes, and (6) the
private bar.
The first measure, website security, centers on the
already-mentioned restrictions that primary-market sellers like
Ticketmaster institute. These include maximum ticket quantities,
CAPTCHA-solving prompts,19 and more sophisticated techniques
starting to emerge that include waiting "queues" with random
assignment of places in line and phone number-identification
verification. 20 Primary-market security measures compete with
scalpers' adapting software in a seemingly endless arms race 21 that

15.
Dana Jaskier, Keep the Tickets with the Fans:A Proposalfor a FederalLaw to Protect
Consumers Against Price Gouging and Counterfeit Tickets in the Secondary Ticketing Market, 44
W. ST. L. REV. 83, 94 (2017).
16.
Schroeder et al., supra note 7, at 31.
17.
This is an economics concept known as "metering." See Thom Lambert, The Efficiency
ofMetering Tie-Ins, TRUTH ON MKT. (July 20, 2011), https://truthonthemarket.com/2011/07/20/theefficiency-of-metering-tie-ins/ [https://perma.cc/Y982-U568] (explaining how metering extracts efficient profits in a simple printer-ink cartridge model).
18.
Jaskier, supra note 15, at 93.
19.
Elefant, supra note 5, at 14.
20.
Ticketmaster Smart Queue, TICKETMASTER https://help.ticketmaster.com/s/article/queue?language=enUS [https://perma.cc/UT7W-92A5] (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
21.
Jaskier, supra note 15, at 95.
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produces higher primary-market administrative costs, forcing
Ticketmaster to charge higher processing fees to end consumers. 22
Dissatisfied by algorithmic ticket purchasers, the Foo Fighters
unveiled a "beat the bots" campaign, where they sold a significant
portion of tickets to fans in person only. 2 3 In-person sales setups entirely
displace online ticket bots. Another approach focuses on rewards
systems for "true" fans. Taylor Swift's rewards program for ticket sales
drew national attention for its novelty. 24 She teamed up with
Ticketmaster in creating a "boost" system that inflated fans' odds of
securing tickets if they were to purchase her album, watch her videos,
and promote her on social media. 25
Another increasingly common procedure to diminish the impact
of ticket bots is a photo-identification requirement for fans who wish to
enter an event. By requiring ticket holders to present photo
identification (at the entrance of events) that matches the name on
purchased tickets, venues effectively disallow ticket resale altogether.
Requiring photo identification faces three main drawbacks, however.
First, ordinary fans who wish to resell their tickets for whatever
reason-an unforeseen emergency, for example-cannot. 26 Next,
purchasing tickets as gifts becomes more difficult because the donor
must always know the donee's name, or venues might require the credit
card holder's name to match the photo identification. 27 Finally, group
ticket purchases are more logistically cumbersome because one credit
card purchaser who buys tickets on behalf of a group would be required
to wait until all group members arrive before entering a stadium. 2 8
Instead of internalizing costs to avoid ticket bots, venues have
increasingly opted to try to expel ticket bots by simply raising prices on
the primary market. In a variety of ways, teams and performers have
changed their pricing strategies so as to suppress scalper surplus. The

22.
Matt Vittone, Live! Tonight! Sold Out! - Lessons from FTC's Online Event
Tickets Workshop, FRANKFURT KURNIT KLEIN + SELZ (July 10, 2019), https://advertisinglaw.fkks.com/post/102fnmw/ive-tonight-sold-out-lessons-from-ftes-online-event-tickets-workshop [https://perma.cc/G8P6-QTFC] (describing how ticket-selling websites increase their fees to
account for developing technologies to "guard against bots").
23.
Jaskier, supra note 15, at 94.
24.
Chris Morris, Want to Improve Your Odds of Seeing Taylor Swift in Concert? Buy Her
Album, FORTUNE (Aug. 30, 2017, 12:33 PM), https://fortune.com/2017/08/30/taylor-swift-concerttickets/ [https://perma.cc/MM53-C4KU].
25.
Id.
26.
Robert J. McFadden, Note, The BOTS Act: A Small Step for Fankind when a Giant
Leap Is Needed, 55 WASHBURN L.J. 427, 440-41 (2016).
27.
Id.
28.
Id.
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Atlanta Braves, 29 the Rolling Stones, 30 and the Kansas City Royals, 31
for example, all use a species of "dynamic pricing." In other words, they
adjust prices for events based on demand factors like time or day 32 of

ticket sale. Sports organizations have also entered into exclusive
contracts with secondary-market websites in order to establish a
proprietary exchange that cuts out scalpers. 33 Sports teams will
sometimes give tickets directly to secondary websites and stipulate
minimum price floors. 34 Finally, Ticketmaster, the largest player in the
primary market, opened its own secondary-market website called
"TicketsNow" to catch downstream transactions in that exchange. 35
Separate from the above measures, some venues or performers
turn to the private bar to bring legal action against those who
violate bots-related rules. When scalpers violate contractual terms
when buying tickets, this gives sports franchises, performers, and
primary-ticket market sites the ability to bring suit against scalpers for
infractions. The New England Patriots forbid season-ticket holders
from reselling tickets, and famously pursue litigation against fans who
violate this policy and against sites like StubHub for facilitating
exchanges violative of the Patriots' policies.

36

B. Government Enforcement
Government enforcement is not mutually exclusive from private
enforcement, but rather the two run parallel. Before Congress codified
the BOTS Act in 2016, a patchwork of different state laws shaped the
ticket-scalping regulatory landscape. 37 As expected with state-level
regulations, there are many nuances in these laws, but four broad

Tim Tucker, Braves Join New Trend in Ticketing: Dynamic Pricing, ATLANTA
29.
J.-CONST. (Mar. 21, 2012), https://www.aje.com/sports/baseball/braves-join-new-trend-ticketingdynamic-pricing/gqr4OL6xgdm2CEd8Su6lcJ/ [https://perma.cc/JWL2-TCUP].
Jaskier, supra note 15, at 94.
30.
31.
Schroeder et al., supra note 7, at 31.
32.
Tucker, supra note 29. A Friday-night ticket will be more expensive than a
Tuesday-afternoon one, for example.
33.
Eric Auchard, Major League Baseball Taps StubHub as Ticket Reseller, REUTERS (Aug.
21, 2007, 11:05 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-baseball-tickets-stubhub/major-leaguebaseball-taps-stubhub-as-ticket-reseller-idUSN0142267620070802
[https://perma.cc/2LH4KZC2].
Schroeder et al., supra note 7, at 32.
34.
35.
McFadden, supra note 26, at 450-51.
36.
Yarde Metals, Inc. v. New Eng. Patriots Ltd. P'ship, 834 N.E.2d 1233, 1234-35 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2005) (demonstrating how unauthorized ticket resale can lead to an actionable breach of
contract claim from the New England Patriots); see Schroeder et al., supra note 7, at 26-27, 30.
37.
Jaskier, supra note 15, at 88-92; Schroeder et al., supra note 7, at 27-30.
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categories account for the majority of these statutes: outright bans,
price restrictions, bots bans, or no regulation whatsoever.
Some states, like North Carolina and Rhode Island, prohibit
ticket scalping altogether. 38 This outright-ban approach invites
aforementioned jurisdictional challenges. A significant number of
states prohibit scalpers from selling tickets on the secondary market at
any price greater than face value. This type of regulatory scheme is
generally termed a "price restriction." 39
Some states, like New York and Tennessee, prohibit the use
of ticket-purchasing computer software and bots.4 0 Like prohibiting
ticket scalping altogether, banning bots altogether presents both
jurisdictional and logistical hurdles for enforcement. Finally, some
states lack any regulations whatsoever for ticket scalping.4 1
Though state-level legislation is not new in this arena and
some attorneys general have pursued enforcement actions based on
state law, 4 2 overall enforcement capabilities are traditionally weak for
two central reasons. First, jurisdictional complexities inherent in
out-of-state, online users make it impossible to prosecute certain
violators. 43 Second, tracking down the faceless, sometimes anonymous,
individuals who use bots to purchase tickets is a technologically
impracticable endeavor.4 4
Against this backdrop of minimal state enforcement targeting
scalpers who use bots to purchase tickets, the federal government
sought to provide more comprehensive enforcement capabilities via the
BOTS Act. The Senate Report for the act documents the conventional
justifications for the legislation, which mirrors the states' justifications
for state legislation targeting the same activity. The Senate Report
elucidates that the act seeks to "ensure equitable consumer access to
tickets for any given event" and to "make tickets available equitably

Schroeder et al., supra note 7, at 29-30.
38.
Id. at 27-30.
39.
40.
Id. at 29-30; see also Matt Griffin, Fixing Tennessee's Broken Live-Event Ticketing
Industry, TENNESSEAN (Mar. 14, 2016, 5:38 PM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/opinion/contributors/2016/03/14/fixing-tennessees-broken-live-event-ticketing-industry/81484050/
[https://perma.cc/J3NX-G8QQ].
41.
Schroeder et al., supra note 7, at 27-30.
42.

EVENT TICKET SALES, supra note 8, at 48-49.

43.
McFadden, supra note 26, at 437-38; Nate Rau, Despite State Law, Scalpers'
Computers Snap
Up
Seats,
TENNESSEAN
(Nov.
9,
2014),
https://www.tennessean.com/story/money/industries/music/20 14/11/09/ticket-bots-tennessee/187663 15/
[https://perma.cc/M4RS-AYNE].
44.
Nevra Azerkan, Note & Comment, Sold Out: Why the Music Industry Needs to Urge
Lawmakers to Regulate How Concert Tickets are Distributed, 38 WHITTIER L. REV. 130, 137 (2018).
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and at reasonable prices."4 5 The report goes on to highlight that the
BOTS Act aims to "ensure a large percentage of tickets remain available
to fans at fair and reasonable prices."4 6 More, the report admonishes the
average 49 percent markups scalpers enjoy above the ticket seller's
posted price.4 7 In other words, the Senate Report provides two
rationales for the statute: to ensure end consumers (a) have equitable
access to tickets, and (b) pay reasonable prices for those tickets. As
enacted in 2016 and in relevant part, the BOTS Act makes it illegal to
"circumvent a security measure, access control system, or other
technological control or measure on an Internet website or online
service that is used by the ticket issuer to enforce posted event ticket
purchasing limits or to maintain the integrity of posted online ticket
purchasing order rules."4 8

The BOTS Act thus does not ban secondary-ticket market profits
altogether, nor does it ban scalping activity, but instead it more closely
resembles the North Carolina and New York statutes that prohibit the
use of ticket-purchasing bots. Additionally, Congress makes clear that
infringement of the BOTS Act is also an "unfair or deceptive act" in
violation of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act.4 9 Enforcement,
therefore, rests with the FTC through its Bureau of Consumer
Protection.5 0
The Federal Trade Commission has yet to finalize any
enforcement actions rooted in the BOTS Act, but the agency is
reportedly monitoring the ticket industry for actionable claims.
Meanwhile, New York and Washington state attorney general offices
have prosecuted violators of BOTS-like, state-level regulations, so
federal action seems imminent.5 1 Though the BOTS Act creates more
broadly encompassing enforcement at the federal level-bringing the
resources of the Federal Trade Commission and sidestepping of the
aforementioned interstate jurisdictional challenges-commentators on
the topic have lauded the statute or called for even greater protection
from ticket-purchasing bots. 52 This Note argues just the opposite: the

45.
46.
47.
48.
1401, 1401.
49.
50.
51.

S. REP. NO. 114-391, at 1-2 (2016).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 2.
Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274,

§ 2(a)(1)(A),

130 Stat.

§ 2(b)(1), 130 Stat. at 1401-02.
§ 2(b)(1)-(2), 130 Stat. at 1401-02.
EVENT TICKET SALES, supra note 8, at 48-49.

52.
See generally Elefant, supra note 5; Jaskier, supra note 15; Azerkan, supra note 44;
McFadden, supra note 26; Dylan C. Porcello, Note, A Fixed Game: The Frustrations of Ticket
Scalping and the Realities of Its Solutions, 84 BROOK. L. REV. 259 (2018).
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BOTS Act attacks an imaginary market defect and, consequently,
should be repealed or removed from the FTC's authority.
II. THE BOTS ACT ATTEMPTS TO SOLVE A MARKET FAILURE
WHERE NONE EXISTS
Imagine a nonprofit organization hosts a charity event and
organizes a raffle for all attendees. The nonprofit gives out raffle tickets
and stipulates that each participant can receive one ticket at maximum.
All participants pay nothing to enter the raffle, and they all value the
prize at some positive dollar amount; their willingness to pay is
therefore greater than their offered payment amount of zero dollars. In
other words, the raffle will result in the winner accumulating consumer
surplus.
Now imagine that a particular attendee, Scott Scammer, figures
out a way to circumvent the nonprofit's ticket limit. Perhaps he forges
the ticket numbers or hacks into the nonprofit's computer system.
Better yet, suppose Scott Scammer figures out a way to accumulate
hundreds of tickets. All the while, each of the other attendees has just
one ticket. Not surprisingly, based on Scott's unscrupulous gobbling of
tickets, he wins the charity raffle and enjoys all the consumer surplus
therein. The other attendees did not pay anything, but they did not have
a fair chance at winning the raffle. Moreover, these other attendees did
not violate the nonprofit's regulations, while Scott did. Even if Scott
ventured to sell his pirated prize on the black market, only the richest
attendee (or the one willing to pay the most for the prize) would be able
to acquire the good. Although the noncheating raffle participants did
not obtain the good, they also did not suffer any economic harm. Each
participant hoped to win the raffle prize because each placed a positive
value on the prize and would not have paid anything for winning the
prize. So, Scott's scheme-ridden ways lessened the likelihood that a
noncheating raffle participant could enjoy consumer surplus from the
raffle.
What should be the appropriate response to Scott's behavior in
duping the nonprofit, acquiring hundreds of tickets, and unfairly
winning the raffle? Perhaps it might make sense to put pressure on the
nonprofit to institute more secure procedures at the next auction. Or
maybe the nonprofit should sue Scott and anyone involved in the
scheme. What if Congress were to pass a law forbidding the Scotts of
the world from violating nonprofits' charity raffle rules, and Congress
went further to rest enforcement authority of this statute in the
purview of the Federal Trade Commission? This response would be
logically untenable and a reallocation of government resources to an
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unjust end-one void of any legitimate consumer harm. Unfortunately,
this is the exact solution Congress has instituted through the BOTS
Act with respect to unscrupulous ticket scalpers who violate
primary-market distributors' contractual terms. Notwithstanding the
collective distaste for scalper surplus, legislating against this activity
via the BOTS Act invokes an indefensible allocation of scarce
government resources.

A. No Market Defect nor Consumer Harm Exists
Despite Congress's claim that the BOTS Act seeks to bring forth
"reasonable prices" and "equitable access" to tickets, 53 these two goals
are one and the same. Tickets are easily accessible on the secondary
market, and willing consumers with means to afford secondary-ticket
prices have no trouble accessing these tickets. Congress's aim to create
"reasonable" ticket prices is detestable because there is no way for
the government to omnisciently ascertain what constitutes a reasonable
price for each ticket at each second of the day. Relatedly, what
"price" is Congress referring to? The primary-ticket price? The
secondary-ticket price? The average ticket price for all tickets in both
the primary and secondary market? Primary-ticket market prices are
related to secondary-ticket market prices, so the congressional aim of a
reasonable "price" poses more questions than it answers. With respect
to the allegedly unreasonable prices on the secondary market, ticket
bots do not create the high prices on that market. Instead, consumer
demand generates the high prices in that market. Furthermore, a
consumer's inability to glut herself with consumer surplus 5 4 (by
purchasing tickets at prices below her willingness to pay) is not a
cognizable consumer harm. On the contrary, this outcome differs from
legitimate consumer harms-ones with real fraud or deception-that
the FTC otherwise prosecutes.5 5 Finally, even if the BOTS Act were
effective in reducing secondary-ticket prices, it could nonetheless be
welfare detracting. As mere middlemen, scalpers, by definition, buy
tickets with the express purpose of reselling those tickets. Ordinary

53.

S. REP. NO. 114-391, at 1, 4 (2016).

54.

KARL E. CASE & RAY C. FAIR, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 80-81 (7th ed. 2004)

(defining "consumer surplus" as "the difference between the maximum amount a person is willing
to pay for a good and its current market price").
55.
Carol Kando-Pineda, Scammers Create Fake Emergencies to Get Your Money, FTC:
CONSUMER INFO. (July 3, 2018), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/20 18/07/scammers-createfake-emergencies-get-your-money [https://perma.cc/2EVQ-NJBB]; Family Emergency Scams,
FTC: CONSUMER INFO. (June 2012), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0204-family-emergency-scams [https://perma.cc/9X8W-NBEF].
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consumers, on the other hand, are more likely to suffer from the
endowment effect,56 preventing welfare -enhancing secondary sales
from taking place.
1. The Twin Aims of the BOTS Act Collapse into One
The BOTS Act is couched in terms of supporting the dual goals
of ensuring (a) "reasonable prices" for and (b) "equitable access" to
tickets.5 7 In reality, these dual aims collapse into one: reasonable prices.
Consumers who are unencumbered by price deterrents can easily access
tickets on the secondary market. In fact, as will be later discussed,
in a world without the BOTS Act, endowment effects would likely lead
to fewer transactions and, thus, diminished consumer access to
tickets. Moreover, there is nothing inherently special about purchasing
tickets from Ticketmaster or an arena's website instead of on a
secondary-market site like StubHub. As distinct from the value a
consumer might derive from purchasing an apple at a farmers market
from the harvester of that fruit, a consumer has no parallel interest in
purchasing the ticket from Ticketmaster instead of from StubHub.5 8 If
price in the primary market were equal to price in the secondary
market, then the "equitable access" rationale would rightly evaporate.
Therefore, the BOTS Act aims to accomplish the singular goal of
cajoling "reasonable" prices for consumers in the ticket industry.
2. Legislating "Reasonable" Ticket Prices Is a
Repugnant Statutory Aim
Government efforts to decree reasonable prices reek of
Soviet-era central planning.5 9 Aside from the impossible task of
coordinating each member of society's heterogeneous preferences in
determining price, the government faces the inexorable roadblock that
"the reasonable fixed price today may through economic and business
changes become the unreasonable price of tomorrow."6 0 Situating the
federal government as an omniscient price commander is, therefore, an
absurd legislative goal. Even if the goal of the BOTS Act were to
56.
Ziv Carmon & Dan Ariely, Focusing on the Forgone: How Value Can Appear So
Different to Buyers and Sellers, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 360, 360 (2000).
57.
Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274, 130 Stat. 1401; S. REP.
No. 114-391, at 1, 4.
58.
This analogy comes from Kevin Stack, Vanderbilt University Law School professor,
discussing how the access argument collapses into the reasonable-price argument.
59.
Michael Manove & Martin L. Weitzman, Aggregation for Material Balances, 2 J.
CoMP. ECON. 1 (1978).
60.
United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927).
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establish price ceilings, rather than changing prices on any given day,
this would still amount to a condemnable objective. The one area in
which virtually all economists agree is that price ceilings lead to a
shrinking in supply known as a shortage.6 1 Therefore, price-ceiling
regulationS 62 tend to effectuate higher prices, which is the exact
opposite result these measures seek to achieve. 63
What evidence suggests that prices in the ticket industry are too
high and require government oversight? To provide support for the
assertion that tickets currently sell at above-market prices, the BOTS
Act, as well as much of the literature praising the legislation and
similar state measures, relies on a study from the New York attorney
general's office indicating that (a) scalpers buy more than half the
tickets on the primary market, and (b) tickets on the secondary market
sell on average 49 percent above the primary market's listed prices. 6 4
This evidence is flawed in two respects. First, the study does not discuss
the percentage of tickets sold on the secondary market before the onset
of algorithmic scalping. Though on its face unlikely, it could be the case
that the advent of bots did not increase the percentage of primary
tickets resold on the secondary market. Next, and more importantly,
this study does not address the fact that a change in the number of
61.
See Megan McArdle, The One Issue Every Economist Can Agree Is Bad: Rent
Control, WASH. POST (June 14, 2019, 7:13 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/06/15/comeback-rent-control-just-time-make-housing-shortages-worse/
[https://perma.cc/HSQ3-7YVB].
62.
Price-ceiling regulations typically surface in the case of "necessity" goods, like housing,
food, or electricity. Necessity goods are less sensitive to income changes than "normal" goods. But
high-end concert and sporting tickets are not necessity goods. In fact, for some ticket transactions,
they are probably "luxury" goods; this means that when income increases, demand for these
products increases by a greater proportion than income. Typical examples of luxury goods include
yachts or expensive diamonds. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that legislators set price ceilings
for necessity goods because these legislators intend to reduce the price of things like food, medicine,
or shelter. Though the economics literature generally finds that price ceilings lead to higher prices,
it is quite understandable and, to a certain extent, laudable that these lawmakers intend to reduce
prices on these sorts of goods. Unfortunately, these intentions are not realized, because price
ceilings usually lead to higher prices. So, that the BOTS Act targets non-necessity goods is
perplexing. Like in the case of price ceilings for necessity goods, price ceilings for tickets likely do
not produce their intended results. But unlike in the case of price ceilings for necessity goods, price
ceilings for tickets do not invite the same sort of laudable intentions. Consumers would not view
kindly price ceilings on yachts, private jets, or expensive jewelry. So why should Hamilton tickets
fare any differently? See CASE & FAIR, supra note 54, at 49-50 (explaining the difference between
normal and inferior goods); HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS WITH CALCULUS

102 (2014) (defining luxury and necessary goods); Prateek Agarwal, Price Ceiling,
INTELLIGENT ECONOMIST (Feb. 3, 2020), https://www.intelligenteconomist.com/price-ceiling/
[https://perma.cc/N88K-42AL] ("The price ceiling is usually instituted via law and is typically applied to necessary goods like food, rent, and energy sources.").
McArdle, supra note 61.
63.
64.
OBSTRUCTED VIEW, supra note 9, at 4, 15, 19, 25.
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tickets on the secondary market will affect the average price of a ticket
in the secondary market.
Even if fewer tickets enter the secondary market in a bots-free
world, then a higher markup6 5 for the tickets sold in the secondary
market could offset the fact that fewer transactions occur in the
secondary market. In fact, the number of tickets on the secondary
market and average ticket price in that secondary market should
exhibit an inverse relationship; all else equal, lower quantity leads to
inflated price. 66 In sum, the New York attorney general's statistics
reveal very little. Without data on the counterfactual, it remains an
open question how the presence of ticket bots impact prices. Half the
tickets landing on secondary-market sites for 50 percent markups
might sound worrisome, but no evidence indicates what average ticket
prices look like without bots. Without adequate data, Congress
nonetheless felt comfortable standing in the stead of God in adjudging
current prices as not "reasonable" and requiring top-down adjustments.
3. What "Price" Is Congress Attacking?
Congress seeks to create reasonable prices for tickets by way of
the BOTS Act. But there is a crucial question that must be answered
when thinking about the BOTS Act: Which price is Congress talking
about? The average secondary-ticket price? The average ticket price in
both the primary and secondary market? Should season tickets 6 7 be

factored into this "price" analysis? What about add-on, ticket-related
purchases, 68 such as insurance products? 69 There is no single "price" for

65.
A higher markup would be expected if there were fewer tickets available on the
secondary market. A lower supply would lead to increased price in the secondary-market tickets.
See Agarwal, supra note 62.
66.
See Jim Chappelow, Law of Supply and Demand, INVESTOPEDIA: ECON.,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/l/law-of-supply-demand. asp [https://perma.cc/67BM-K97M]
(last updated Sept. 29, 2019).
67.
Oftentimes, consumers feel more comfortable purchasing season tickets for sporting
teams because they can sell high-demand, single-game tickets for high prices. The price of a single
NBA game, for example, thus affects the price of other NBA games. See Mitch Lipka, How to Time
the Season Ticket Market Like a Stock Pro, REUTERS (Apr. 3, 2012, 7:25 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-yourmoney-sportstickets/how-to-time-the-season-ticket-market-like-astock-pro-idUSBRE8320FU20120403 [https://perma.cc/4BAG-G4MH].
68.
Another example of a ticket-related purchase is parking, which often reflects some
bundling. Amber Banks, Vanderbilt University Law School class of 2020 provided this example.
69.
Fansure is a company that sells ticket insurance to NBA fans. If a specified superstar
does not play in an NBA game, then Fansure will pay the ticket holder for the price of the ticket.
See About Us, FANSURE https://fansure.com/user/aboutUs [https://perma.cc/ZG3P-JDHX] (last
visited Mar. 30, 2020).
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sporting events or concert tickets but rather different prices over time. 70
Accordingly, when Congress seeks to omnisciently determine the "price"
of tickets, it must specify which price it seeks to decree.
Primary-market ticket purchasers have several risk-bearing
assumptions baked into their buying decisions. For example, a
concertgoer does not know the precise weather forecast for the day of
the concert. If on the day of the concert the weather is unusually nice,
then the primary-ticket purchaser might wish to sell his tickets for a
profit; if it is rainy or cold, then he might have trouble finding another
buyer. Similarly, the football fan cannot know whether his favorite
team will be in playoff contention later in the season. A primary-ticket
purchaser can never fully predict if an unforeseen event like an
emergency will prevent him from attending. In the case of NBA
games, 7 1 a fan cannot be sure that the superstar player will be healthy
enough to play on a given night. 72 All these examples highlight the
reality that secondary-market price setting does not operate in isolation
but rather sends pricing ripples into the primary market as well.
The Senate Report for the BOTS Act admonishes the
above-face value markups tickets exhibit on the secondary market. 73
Presumably, then, Congress targets secondary-ticket prices as being too
high. This makes little sense, given the fact that tickets on the primary
market are more expensive than ever.74 Also, ticket prices for a single
event or game affect the price of other tickets during the season.
Commonly, consumers agree to become season-ticket holders because
they have the assurance of selling high-demand, single-game tickets
for high resale prices. 75 Furthermore, money cannot be viewed in a

70.
See Lipka, supra note 67.
71.
See About Us, supra note 69.
For this reason, companies have stepped in to offer superstar-absence insurance so
72.
that fans can purchase the right to be reimbursed if a particular star does not play on a given
night. See id. If the government caps resale profits, this sets some maximum price consumers pay
on sites like StubHub. But if this causes a mere substitution into buying risk-bearing products,
then consumers are still paying for the risk agreement in addition to the posted ticket price. So, if
the government is concerned about ticket prices, then it should be concerned as well about these
risk-agreement prices and market therein; that market is engulfed into the total price of the
tickets.
73.
Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274, 130 Stat. 1401; S. REP.
No. 114-391, at 2, 4 (2016).
74.
Anne Steele, Why Concert Tickets Are So Expensive, WALL STREET J.,
https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-concert-tickets-are-so-expensive- 1157737 1024?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1 [https://perma.cc/W6VM-N4X7] (last updated Dec. 26, 2019, 2:02 PM).
75.
See Ben Hoffman, How to Buy Sports Tickets, N.Y. TIMES: SPORTS, https://www.nytimes.com/guides/sports/buying-sports-tickets-events [https://perma.cc/C8XP-5MSJ] (last visited
Mar. 30, 2020) ("Some fans have adopted a strategy of signing up for a season ticket plan to get
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vacuum; inflation and the time value of money7 6 require Congress to
constantly adjust the decreed "reasonable" price each second of the day.
4. Ticket Bots Do Not Create High Prices
Assuming Congress is right that ticket prices for sporting
events, concerts, and theatrical performances are high, what causes the
high prices consumers face? Unfortunately for proponents of the BOTS
Act, ticket bots are not the culprit of high ticket prices. Just like in any
other competitive market, the forces of supply and demand determine
the equilibrium prices in the ticket market.7 7 The scalpers do not cause
the high demand in the secondary market; they respond to it.78
Consumer demand for tickets-even tickets at prices well above
primary-ticket market prices-incentivizes the creation of the scalper
market. If the ticket bots did not exist, then the secondary market
would still flourish because underpriced primary-market tickets give
way to excess demand for those tickets.79 But if, on the other hand, there
were no excess demand in the primary market, then scalpers (with
or without bots) would be homeless in this setup. Accordingly,
high secondary-ticket market prices (through excess demand in the
primary-ticket market) create bots, not vice versa. Therefore,
legislators entirely miss the plot by trying to remove bots from the
secondary-ticket market. That is to say, the BOTS Act shoots the
proverbial messenger.
5. Ticket Bots Produce No Cognizable Consumer Harm
Suppose an end consumer either (a) purchases a StubHub ticket
for double the price she would have paid on Ticketmaster or (b) has been
priced out of the market because she cannot afford the StubHub price
but could have afforded the Ticketmaster price. In either case, the
consumer cannot point to a cognizable harm. In the first scenario, the
consumer pays at or below her willingness to pay for the ticket.
all the games they want to attend, and then trying to mitigate the cost by selling tickets to
games they are less interested in.").
76.
See generally Evan Tarver, What Impact Does Inflation Have on the Dollar Value
Today?, INVESTOPEDIA: ECON., https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/042415/what-impactdoes-inflation-have-time-value-money. asp [https://perma.cc/VZS3-W8RF] (last updated June 25,
2019).
77.
Hannah Pouler, A Little Supply, a Lot of Demand: The Evolution of Ticket Scalping,
Bus. TODAY ONLINE J. (Jan. 26, 2018), https://journal.businesstoday.org/bt-online/20 18/a-littlesupply-a-lot-of-demand-the-evolution-of-ticket-scalping [https://perma.cc/2SU8-9AHR].
78.
Gregory M. Stein, Will Ticket ScalpersMeet the Same Fate as Spinal Tap Drummers?
The Sale and Resale of Concert and Sports Tickets, 42 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (2014).
Id.
79.
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Granted, if she could have obtained a ticket on Ticketmaster, she would
have paid an even lower price and thus would have enjoyed some
positive amount of consumer surplus.8 0 But this buyer has no right to
windfalls in the form of consumer surplus. This is the functional
equivalent of asserting that, in line with the aforementioned analogy, a
consumer has a right to win a charity raffle award. In the second
scenario, where the buyer is priced out of the secondary market, two
possibilities exist. First, even without the existence of ticket bots, only
a fraction of willing consumers can acquire tickets on the primary
market. So, by not being one of the lucky few to acquire tickets in the
primary market, the consumer would have been in the exact same
ticketless position in the bots-filled and bots-less worlds. Second, even
if this hypothetical buyer could show she would have obtained the
Ticketmaster ticket in a bots-less world, there still would be no harm
because this buyer has no right to purchase that ticket at the price she
desires. In other words, the performer can set prices at whatever price
he wishes, can reserve tickets for friends at specialized prices, can play
for a special event with no tickets at all, or can create any number of
idiosyncratic systems designed to allocate tickets to fans.8 1 A would-be
buyer has no right, therefore, to purchase a ticket from Ticketmaster.
model 82
ticket-pricing
dynamic
Stones'
The
Rolling
demonstrates the impoverished logic of suggesting consumers enjoy
some right to purchase tickets below their willingness to pay. The
Rolling Stones sought to crowd scalpers out of the ticket market by
adjusting primary-ticket market prices for concert events based on
changing demand characteristics. 83 Consumers faced higher prices,
Rolling Stones successfully appropriated a greater percent of the
rents available, and scalpers could not exploit the same degree of
secondary-market markups as they would have without the dynamic
pricing model.84 Therefore, the higher prices in the primary market led
to an evisceration of the secondary market (and any bots used to
lubricate transactions therein).8 5 But it also led to the same sorts of high
prices in the primary market consumers would have otherwise seen in
the secondary market had dynamic pricing not taken shape. 86 In this
80.
CASE & FAIR, supra note 54, at 80-81 (defining "consumer surplus" as "the difference
between the maximum amount a person is willing to pay for a good and its current market price").
81.
One can imagine an unobjectionable ticket system that a Silicon Valley company
might create so that only the best hackers get access to tickets.
82.
Jaskier, supra note 15, at 94.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
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setup, what consumer harm unraveled? If one adopts the reasoning of
the BOTS Act, then a consumer harm must exist simply because a class
of buyers could not purchase tickets below their willingness to pay.
Certainly, this cannot be the test for consumer harm, lest consumers
achieve causes of action for every desirable consumer surplus
imaginable.
6. The BOTS Act Is Welfare Detracting, Not Welfare Enhancing
If ticket bots disappeared, then only buyers lucky enough to
gobble up tickets in the primary market (without the aid of bots) would
sell tickets on the secondary market. When these ordinary buyers
obtain tickets in the primary market, however, their willingness to
accept bids for the tickets strangely increases. The endowment effect
operates in such a way as to drive these purchasers' willingness to
accept upward by the mere fact of ownership over the tickets.8 7 Mere
middlemen who employ ticket bots for the express purpose of resale on
the secondary market, on the other hand, obviously would not reveal
the same ownership-based increase in willingness to accept based on an
endowment effect. Therefore, that the ticket bots presumably lead to a
greater percent of primary tickets selling on the secondary market for
lower prices means that more transactions take place on the secondary
market. More transactions occurring on the secondary market means
that greater surplus-both from sellers and purchasers in the
secondary market-transpires in a world where ticket bots facilitate
scalping. Therefore, the BOTS Act's express goal in curbing ticket-bot
usage leads to a decrease rather than increase in total surplus in the
ticket-sales market. Consequently, the BOTS Act is welfare detracting,
not welfare enhancing.
B. Enforcement of the BOTS Act Should Not Rest with the
FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection
The BOTS Act targets a type of activity that finds no home in
the FTC's consumer-protection mission of preventing "unfair, deceptive,
and fraudulent business practices."8 8 When consumers purchase tickets
on the secondary market, they have full information in that purchasing
decision and are not duped by swindlers. They might pay higher
prices than they wish to pay, but they do not face some sort of con or

87.
See generally Carmon & Ariely, supra note 56, at 360.
Bureau of Consumer Protection, FTC, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-of88.
fices/bureau-consumer-protection [https://perma.cc/M98N-S4UF] (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
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trick-the cornerstones of the FTC's consumer-protection dominion.8 9
Even if this ticket-purchasing activity did fall within the FTC's
consumer-protection mission, the agency still has scarce resources.9 0
Thwarting more obviously fraudulent activity is a more defensible use
of those scarce resources. Additionally, when the FTC prosecutes BOTS
Act violations, it awkwardly and unjustifiably plays the roles of private
contract drafter and private contract enforcer. Billion-dollar giants like
Ticketmaster do not deserve contractual enforcement subsidies from
the federal government.9 1
1. BOTS Act Enforcement Falls Outside the Scope of the
FTC's Consumer-Protection Mission
The Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Consumer
Protection seeks to prevent "unfair, deceptive, and fraudulent business
practices." 92 The FTC clarifies that it targets businesses that fail to
"make good on their promises or cheat people out of money." 93 The
typical FTC consumer-protection enforcement actions mirror these
delineated goals. For example, a common scam is when individuals
pretend to be police officers in order to scare citizens into paying debts
that may or may not exist.94 A related scam involves those who pretend
to be Internal Revenue Service employees hunting down citizens for tax
evasion.9 5 Another typical scam involves companies that make false
claims about their products, including claims that their aloe creams
cure lifelong conditions like Crohn's disease. 96 An additional scheme
centers on the unauthorized use of celebrities' photos in order to fool
consumers into believing those celebrities actually promote the

89.

Id.

90.

FED. TRADE COMMN, FISCAL YEAR 2020 CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION

(2019), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/fy-2020-congressional-budget-justification/fy_2020_cbj.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS7B-WR8G] [hereinafter FISCAL YEAR 2020].
91.
Peter Cohan, Amazon Seeks to Snag $5 Billion Market from Ticketmaster, FORBES
(Aug. 11, 2017, 8:25 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/petercohan/2017/08/11/amazon-seeks-tosnag-5-billion-market-from-ticketmaster/#17aceb933042 [https://perma.cc/L7QH-BHD4].
92.
Bureau of Consumer Protection, supranote 88.
93.
Id.
94.
Alvaro Puig, Scammers Impersonate the Police, FTC: CONSUMER INFO. (July 17, 2015),
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2015/07/scammers-impersonate-police [https://perma.cc/K3YZVRVZ].
95.
Id.
96.
Lesley Fair, You Had Me at Aloe? FTC Challenges Disease Treatment Claims for Aloe
and Cranberry Products, FTC: BUS. BLOG (Oct. 25, 2019, 12:08 PM), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/blogs/business-blog/2019/10/you-had-me-aloe-ftc-challenges-disease-treament-claims-aloe
[https://perma.cc/N9TL-DJMB].
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products on a particular site.9 7 In another prototypical scam, fraudsters
pretend to be elderly individuals' nephews, nieces, or loved ones and
then act as if they are in an emergency situation in desperate need of
money.98
In stark contrast to the above-mentioned scammers the FTC's
consumer-protection arm typically targets, scalpers who use ticket bots
do not deceive, defraud, or fool consumers. Instead, these scalpers
purchase underpriced tickets from performers.9 9 When ordinary
consumers purchase tickets on the primary or secondary market, they
are not fooled, duped, or deceived. In fact, just the opposite occurs. They
are fully aware of the price they pay for tickets, and they voluntarily
make such transactions. Therefore, absent any indicia of deception or
fraud, the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection should not be tasked
with enforcing the BOTS Act and its imaginary consumer harms, which
bear no resemblance to the FTC's consumer-protection mission.
2. The FTC Should Not Allocate Its Scarce Resources to the BOTS Act
Even if the BOTS Act did fall within the FTC's
consumer-protection mission, then the FTC should dedicate little or no
resources to enforcing the Act. When scammers legitimately dupe, fool,
and deceive consumers-into thinking a product cures a disease, a
government official is collecting money, or a nephew requires cash for a
medical emergency-then the FTC should certainly step in to prosecute
such flagrant wrongdoers. However, scalpers who use ticket bots do not
fool consumers in a comparable way. So, even if such ticket-bot usage
falls within the FTC's mission, it does not lay at the very core of that
mission. Moreover, that the FTC has limited resources 00 and must
exercise discretion in prosecuting fraudsters bolsters the notion
that ticket-bot scalpers ought to remain a low priority on the
consumer-protection enforcement spectrum.
By targeting scalpers who capitalize on Ticketmaster's lack of
rent appropriations, the BOTS Act directs resources to help end
purchasers of Hamilton shows and Floyd Mayweather fights. 101 For

97.
Andrew Johnson, Scammers Are Spoofing News Sites to Promote Health Products,
FTC: CONSUMER INFO. (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/blog/2017/02/scammers-arespoofing-news-sites-promote-health-products [https://perma.cc/G5VK-UE8L].
98.
Kando-Pineda, supra note 55; Family Emergency Scams, supra note 55.
99.
Schroeder et al., supra note 7, at 25-26.
100.

FISCAL YEAR 2020, supra note 90.

101.
John Bonazzo, Ticketmaster Sues Scalping Company that Used Bots to Buy 30,000
'Hamilton'Tickets, OBSERVER (Oct. 5, 2017, 11:57 AM), https://observer.com/2017/10/ticketmasterhamilton-ticket-bots-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/AD9D-KL24].
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these high-cost events, the opportunities for arbitrage (for high
markups between primary- and secondary-ticket markets) would
presumably be the most acute, and the BOTS Act, if enforced, would
have the strongest effect. Accordingly, if a fully enforced BOTS Act
lowered ticket prices, then the most privileged members of society
would reap the lion's share of the benefits of these lower prices. When
the FTC takes action against business coaching scammers, it helps
restore elderly citizens' robbed retirement savings; when the FTC
enforces the BOTS Act, it lowers Hamilton tickets for Tribeca's elite.
This is a socially undesirable reallocation of government resources for
an apparatus designed to protect US consumers.
3. The BOTS Act Inappropriately Situates the Government as a
Private Contract Policeman
The FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection should not enforce
the BOTS Act because the federal government should not enforce
private parties' contractual disputes. The BOTS Act prohibits computer
programs that violate primary-ticket sites' "posted event ticket
purchasing limits" or the "posted online ticket purchasing order
rules." 102 This statutory language expressly outlaws ticket-purchasing
order rules, but who creates these rules? The companies who control the
primary-ticket market websites create these rules, and Ticketmaster
captures more than 80 percent of this market. 103
A few issues surface from a law that bases its enforcement on
Ticketmaster's ordering rules. First, Ticketmaster could change its
rules in any number of imaginable ways that would run counter to both
consumer protection and, more generally, public-governance goals. For
instance, Ticketmaster could change its rules, even if only temporarily,
to the following: "Only card-carrying National Rifle Association (NRA)
members can purchase tickets, and buyers cannot use computer
algorithms to bypass security measures aimed to verify that ticket
purchasers are members of the National Rifle Association." Then,
assume a shifty buyer could use a computer algorithm to pretend as if
he is an NRA member, bypassing Ticketmaster's NRA rules to purchase
tickets. Then, according to the text of the BOTS Act, the Federal Trade
Commission should prosecute this non-NRA buyer as having committed
102.
Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274, § 2(a)(1)(A), 130 Stat.
1401, 1401.
103.
Bill Pascrell Jr., Op-Ed: Everyone's Worst Fears About the Live Nation-Ticketm aster
Merger Have Come True, L.A. TIMES (May 17, 2018, 4:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/oped/la-oe-pascrell-live-nation-concert-ticketing-20180517-story.html
[https://perma.cc/WEN9B26K].
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an "unfair and deceptive act" because he sidestepped Ticketmaster's
"online ticket purchasing order rules."1 04 Why should the federal
government be subservient to the almighty Ticketmaster's
ticket-purchasing rules? These rules could be entirely arbitrary and
undesirable, so placing the federal government in the role of
Ticketmaster' contract policeman strains credulity and rationality.
Ticketmaster, and the performers with whom it contracts, are
sophisticated parties who control the terms in their agreements.10 5
These companies have full information and are not confused about the
ticket quantity limits or other purchasing order rules they put in place.
As such, these parties do not need and should not receive the
governmental subsidies the BOTS Act establishes through placing the
FTC in the role of contract enforcer. If Ticketmaster takes issue with
scalpers utilizing ticket bots that violate the website's "purchasing
order rules," then Ticketmaster itself should prosecute those who
violate its policies. Likewise, if performers truly detest Ticketmaster's
inability to uphold ordering rules, then these performers should
either litigate such violations against Ticketmaster or use another
primary-ticket website that better enforces its contractual provisions.
Even if the government were to police third-party contractual
disputes, the Federal Trade Commission should not do so if the
contractual disputes at issue do not involve ordinary consumers. When
scalpers use ticket bots to purchase hundreds of tickets on
Ticketmaster's website in violation of Ticketmaster's ordering rules,
ordinary consumers are entirely removed from these transactions. It is
not the case that Ticketmaster reneges its promises to nor swindles
ordinary consumers when scalpers violate ordering rules. Instead, it is
the scalpers who swindle Ticketmaster through the use of ticket bots.
As a result, the federal government should not litigate contractual
disputes on behalf of private parties, especially when the private party
is a multibillion-dollar1 06 company like Ticketmaster.
C. The BOTS Act Fails to Cover the Scope of Wrongs It Targets
This Note argues that the BOTS Act aims to remedy a consumer
harm when no consumer harm exists and that enforcement of the BOTS
Act should not rest with the FTC. However, even if one were to accept
Congress's justifications for the BOTS Act and assume it a laudable

104.
§ 2, 130 Stat. at 1401.
105.
Andrew A. Schwartz, Consumer ContractExchanges and the Problem of Adhesion, 28
YALE J. ON REG. 313, 331 (2011).
106.
Cohan, supra note 91.
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public policy tool, the BOTS Act is still objectionable because it fails to
solve the problems it targets. It does nothing to address human-based
services for CAPTCHA solving, it is difficult to enforce, and it does not
produce desired prices even if it is fully enforced.
1. Human-Based CAPTCHA Services Substitute for
Automatic Services
A CAPTCHA, or "completely automated public turing test to tell
computers and humans apart," is a commonly used website tool that is
meant to distinguish between human users and computer programs. 107
The BOTS Act says that scalpers cannot circumvent online security
measures or technological controls in order to violate ticket-purchasing
rules or quantity limits.

108

This makes it illegal for scalpers to pay for

technological services that automatically solve CAPTCHA prompts. But
if a scalper pays a friend to sit in front of a computer on his behalf to
solve a CAPTCHA, then nobody has circumvented an online security
measure. Instead, the scalper and his friend have contracted among
themselves to abide by the security measures.
Because scalpers can, in light of the BOTS ACT, move away from
automated CAPTCHA-solving services and into human-based
CAPTCHA-solving services, this substitution renders the BOTS Act
largely ineffective. The BOTS Act does not cover human-based
CAPTCHA-solving services because these services do not circumvent or
dupe security measures. To think otherwise would mean that nobody
can purchase tickets-for example, as a gift-on behalf of another
person. Human-based CAPTCHA-solving services 0 9 are popular,
cheap, and make it difficult for ordinary consumers without this service
to acquire tickets on the primary market in the same way that
automated services do. Therefore, the BOTS Act likely causes scalper
substitution from automated services to human-based ones without
reducing the price of tickets for end consumers.
There is one additional sense in which the BOTS Act's
encouragement of human-based CAPTCHA-solving services is not
merely consummate with but instead worse than the non-BOTS Act
world. Incentivizing human-based services means that regions with low

107.
Elie Bursztein, Matthieu Martin & John C. Mitchell, Text-Based CAPTCHA Strengths
and Weaknesses, 2011 PROC. 18TH ACM CONF. ON COMPUTER & COMM. SECURITY 125, 125.
108.
§ 2(a)(1), 130 Stat. at 1401.
109.
Top 10 Captcha Solving Services Compared, PROWEBSCRAPER, https://www.prowebscraper.com/blog/top-10-captcha-solving-services-compared/ [https://perma.cc/9MTY-8DBU] (last
visited Mar. 30, 2020).
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labor costs11 0 are the most likely to host these services. Accordingly,
low-income individuals in impoverished areas are, thanks to the BOTS
Act, probably now more likely to sit all day in front of computer screens
solving CAPTCHA prompts that cost users two dollars for each
thousand CAPTCHAs solved.' Our laws should not push people into
this sort of socially wasteful work. 112 Individuals who solve CAPTCHAs
all day do not produce new value for the world; instead, they engage in
this type of work because the BOTS Act artificially induces it.
2. The Nature of Online Transactions Produce Enforcement
Inadequacies that Render the BOTS Act Largely Toothless
Online sales afford convenience by the fact that individuals need
not be physically present in a particular place in order to engage in a
transaction. 113 With an internet connection, one can purchase a vast
array of products from anywhere in the world.11 4 As it pertains to ticket
sales, however, online transactions create an inability to verify the
identity of ticket purchasers in two ways. First, if an automated
computer program decodes a CAPTCHA prompt, then the prompt will
not know whether a human or automated software solved the
CAPTCHA. 115 In this way, the BOTS Act outlaws a relatively
undetectable act. Second, even if ticket-sales websites could detect if an
automated service decoded the CAPTCHA, it still does not reveal who
purchased or deployed the automated software. Through two layers of
online challenges, therefore, the BOTS Act is hard to enforce, making it
largely toothless.

110.
For a discussion of countries with low labor costs, see Ralph Jennings, From India
to the Philippines, These Are the Cheapest Countries in Asia, FORBES (Apr. 12, 2017, 6:00
PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ralphjennings/2017/04/12/these-are-the-5-cheapest-countriesin-asia/#6f8e1f03126a [https://perma.cc/K8GA-DNWM].
111.
Dancho Danchev, Inside India's CAPTCHA Solving Economy, ZDNET (Aug. 29, 2008),
https://www.zdnet.com/article/inside-indias-captcha-solving-economy/
[https://perma.cc/S5CPH2N5].
112.
A counterargument would be, however, that low-wage workers might prefer the BOTS
Act if it contributes to more earnings opportunities.
113.
See Ajeet Khurana, Advantages of E-commerce Over Traditional Retail,
BALANCE
SMALL Bus.,
https://www.thebalancesmb.com/advantages-of-ecommerce- 1141610
[https://perma.cc/5HCG-DX3Z] (last updated Nov. 20, 2019).
114.
Id.
115.
Josh Dzieza, Why CAPTCHAs Have Gotten So Difficult, VERGE (Feb. 1, 2019, 11:00
AM), https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/1/18205610/google-captcha-ai-robot-human-difficult-artificial-intelligence [https://perma.cc/RB7Q-HJHT].
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3. A Fully Enforced BOTS Act Would Not Necessarily
Lower End-Consumer Prices
The BOTS Act is notoriously difficult to enforce. Even if there
were perfect enforcement, however, the BOTS Act would not necessarily
lead to much lower prices for end consumers. If the government could
successfully thwart scalpers' abilities to use computer bots to solve
CAPTCHAs, then scalpers would be at a disadvantage (relative to
the non-BOTS world) in accessing tickets on the primary market.
Nonetheless, ordinary consumers lucky enough to purchase
underpriced tickets in the primary market would still be allowed to
unload those tickets in the secondary market. The BOTS Act does not
eradicate the forces of supply and demand, so excess demand would still
create an incentive for primary-ticket purchasers to sell tickets on
the secondary market for a profit. 116 Consequently, a fully enforced
BOTS Act might slightly diminish, but would not eliminate, the surge
of high-priced tickets on the secondary market. 117 This ultimately
produces the effect of high prices for end consumers, and it is unclear
how these prices fare relative to the counterfactual scenario.
Presumably, high prices would still appear in the secondary market,
which means that the BOTS Act's goal of delivering "reasonable" ticket
prices becomes unrealized even in a perfectly policed BOTS Act
landscape.
III. SOLUTIONS
A. Repeal the BOTS Act
Repealing the BOTS Act reinstates scalpers' capacities to
purchase automated computer programs that solve CAPTCHA
prompts. This solution has several benefits. First, it removes the
government from the position of cajoling Soviet-like price maintenance.
The government is not in the appropriate position to determine what
constitutes a reasonable ticket price, so the repeal of the BOTS Act best
reflects that reality. Second, this solution redirects scarce government
resources to more legitimate ends. There is no cognizable consumer
harm in the realm of online ticket sales because consumers are not
entitled to purchase underpriced tickets. Therefore, instead of pursuing
the strange goal of coaxing inappropriately low-priced tickets for a
lucky fraction of willing ticket purchasers, government resources
116.
Schroeder et al., supra note 7, at 26 ("The existence of the excess demand is
responsible for the secondary ticket market.").
Id.
117.
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should be redirected to areas where legitimate market failures and
consumer harms take place. Third, this solution eliminates what
otherwise amounts to a government handout to primary-market sites
for tickets and performers. It has already been acknowledged that
performers are permitted to set prices as they see fit, such as the case
of the Rolling Stones' "dynamic pricing" strategy. 118 Performers and
primary-ticket vendors can choose prices without government
oversight, and they can enforce contractual provisions without
government oversight. If a multibillion-dollar giant like Ticketmaster' 1 9
wishes to enforce its posted ticket quantity limits or CAPTCHA-solving
rules that it contractually erects, then it can do so through the private
bar. These parties are not helpless; instead, they can privately sue to
enforce contractual terms. They can also take other measures, like
photo-identification requirements, 12 0 to privately dissuade bots-based
scalpers from swallowing massive numbers of tickets on the primary
market.
B. Divorce the FTC from the BOTS Act
The second solution is to unshackle the FTC from the BOTS Act.
As has been delineated in this Note, ticket resale-even with the use of
automated CAPTCHA-solving bots-is not inherently an "unfair" or
"deceptive" act1 2 1 that should be treated similar to other FTC
prosecutorial activities. It is not unfair because consumers have no
right to underpriced tickets, and performers can charge whatever prices
they see fit under the terms they desire. It is not deceptive because
consumers in the secondary market are not duped into purchasing
products under insufficient information; consumers instead are well
aware of their purchasing decisions.
This solution could take two forms. The first would be for
another government agency to carry out the BOTS Act. The BOTS Act
seeks to establish reasonable end prices for tickets, so an agency
specializing in price setting should enforce the BOTS Act. The
US Department of Agriculture (USDA) has had a long history of
price-setting in the milk and dairy industry, 1 22 so another agency might

Jaskier, supra note 15, at 94.
118.
119.
Cohan, supra note 91.
120.
McFadden, supra note 26, at 439-41.
121.
Bureau of Consumer Protection, supranote 88.
122.
See John Stossel, Why Is Government Fixing the Price of Milk?, REASON: FOOD
POL'Y (Sept. 4, 2013, 12:00 PM), https://reason.com/20 13/09/04/why-is-government-fixing-theprice-of-mi/ [https://perma.cc/Y6ZE-PFJD];
Dairy: Policy, USDA:
ECON. RES. SERV.,
https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/animal-products/dairy/policy.aspx
[https://perma.cc/WXM3-

2020]

CONSUMER HARM AND THE BOTS ACT

977

follow some USDA procedures when the government follows the BOTS
Act to lower ticket prices. The actions outlawed by the BOTS Act are
not unfair or deceptive; the government can enforce the act if it wishes,
but no agency should dress up ticket price setting as consumer
protection. The second approach would be to keep the BOTS Act on the
books but relieve the FTC from enforcement of the act, and instead
allow private parties to sue under the BOTS Act. This way, performers
and primary-ticket vendors could rely on federal law, instead of their
own contractual provisions, when attempting to enjoin bots-wielding
scalpers from using computer programs to bypass CAPTCHA codes in
the purchase of tickets.
C. Real Price Setting: CappingResale Profits
Congress does not hide its intentions with respect to the BOTS
Act: the goal is to produce "reasonable" ticket prices for end
consumers. 12 3 The BOTS Act prohibits software programs that sidestep
online security measures, 124 which Congress hopes will spur lower
ticket prices. For a number of reasons, including that the government's
price setting of tickets is not a worthy aim, this Note argues the
BOTS Act should either be repealed or taken out of the FTC's
consumer-protection wing. But even if government-mandated
"reasonable" ticket prices were a laudable public-policy goal, then the
BOTS Act should still be replaced by a more straightforward legislative
alternative.
One way the government could set ticket prices is through
capping the above-face value ticket price that secondary-market
suppliers can charge. For example, the government could prohibit ticket
resellers from charging any above-face value price. Or, the government
could say that secondary-market suppliers can charge a maximum of,
say, 10 percent above face value for ticket resales. This would be easier
to enforce than the BOTS Act because government agents could, instead
of developing sophisticated tools to decipher whether a human or a
bot solved a CAPTCHA code, simply compare StubHub's price with
the face-value price of a ticket to determine the legality of a
secondary-market ticket resale. Additionally, as has been previously
outlined, a fully enforced BOTS Act could very well leave end-consumer
3AEX] (last updated Mar. 24, 2020); How Milk Is Really Priced in the U.S., FARM
BUREAU (July 15, 2019), https://www.fb.org/market-intel/how-milk-is-really-priced-in-the-u.s
[https://perma.cc/6UN4-SEK6].
123.
Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-274, 130 Stat. 1401; S. REP.
No. 114-391, at 2, 4 (2016).
124.
Better Online Ticket Sales Act of 2016; S. REP. No. 114-391, at 2, 4.
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prices at similar levels because primary-market ticket purchasers will
still have an incentive to charge high prices on the secondary market if
arbitrage opportunities exist. 125 A government cap on resale prices, on
the other hand, directly addresses resale ticket prices with a blunt and
direct instrument. Super high prices on the secondary market would
not be discouraged-they would be illegal.
Although a government-determined ceiling on ticket-resale
profits is a more effective way to actualize the goals of the BOTS Act
than is the BOTS Act itself, several features of this alternative
approach must be highlighted. First, a cap on resale profit appears to
punish ticket resellers who wish to extract high profits. These resellers
appear to be the ones who "pay" for this legislative approach. But this
is not true. The incidence of a tax, meaning the one who bears the
burden of the tax, depends not on who the tax is levied against but
rather the respective supply and demand elasticities of market
participants. 12 6 Second, this solution would not eliminate incentives to
cheat. With sufficiently high arbitrage incentives, a ticket-resale black
market would emerge. Third, this measure will affect primary-market
ticket prices. Even if the average ticket price in the secondary market
becomes lower, the average consumer might pay higher prices in the
primary market or be more likely to purchase ticket insurance
products. 127 If this approach were to artificially lower all ticket-related
prices, then suppliers would find these endeavors less profitable and,

125.
Schroeder et al., supra note 7, at 26.
126.
See Elasticity and Tax Revenue, KHAN ACAD.: ECON. & FIN., https://www.khanacademy.org/economics-finance-domain/microeconomics/elasticity-tutorial/price-elasticity-tutorial/a/elasticity-and-tax-incidence [https://perma.cc/KLJ5-CUKB ] (last visited Mar. 30, 2020)
("The tax incidence depends on the relative price elasticity of supply and demand."). The same
holds true in the case of a tax on billion-dollar yachts. One might think of the billionaire yacht
buyers as "paying" for this yacht tax, but whether yacht purchasers or suppliers (for example, the
middle-class salesperson) are less responsive to changes in price. See id.
127.
One type of ticket insurance product is the one offered by Fansure, a California-based
start-up that compensates fans for their ticket prices if a star player does not play on a
given night. Dave Lee, Favourite Player's Injured? Get a Refund, BBC NEWS (Feb. 13,
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thus, would be less likely to supply events and less likely to invest in
quality as a means to attract buyers. 128
IV. CONCLUSION

Congress sought to effectuate "reasonable" ticket prices when it
passed the BOTS Act in 2016.129 The BOTS Act prohibits ticket resellers
from using software to bypass security measures or automatically solve
CAPTCHA codes. However, no consumer harm exists for the BOTS Act
to remedy with respect to the ticket-resale industry-consumers have
no right to purchase underpriced tickets, and performers can set prices
at whatever value they wish. Furthermore, congressional aspiration of
reasonable prices is murky because there is no single ticket price.
Instead, the face value of tickets, resale value of tickets, season tickets
for sporting events, and extraneous ticket-related purchases like ticket
insurance are all dependent upon one another. Worse, Congress rests
enforcement authority of the BOTS Act with the FTC's Bureau of
Consumer Protection. However, this sort of activity is entirely
unrelated to consumer protection. Unlike the FTC's enforcement of
legitimate consumer harms and deception, such as schemes that
defraud the elderly through fake calling schemes or the promotion of
fake herbal medicines, the enforcement of low ticket prices has nothing
to do with deception-related transactions. Finally, even if cajoling
low-priced tickets were a laudable public-policy goal, the BOTS Act is
ill-equipped to tackle that goal. It permits scalpers to substitute into
human-based CAPTCHA-solving services, it is difficult to enforce, and
even if it were fully enforced, the effect on ticket prices is still uncertain.
Against this backdrop, the two most defensible alternative solutions are
to repeal the BOTS Act or to remove it from the purview of the FTC.
Otherwise, if Congress wishes to legitimately affect secondary-market
resale prices, then it should do so in the most direct and easily

128.
For a similar example demonstrating that government price ceilings on housing lead
to diminished quality, see Price Ceilings and Price Floors, KHAN ACAD.: ECON. & FIN.,
https://www.khanacademy.org/economics-finance-domain/microeconomics/consumer-producersurplus/deadweight-loss-tutorial/a/price-ceilings-and-price-floors-cnx
[https://perma.cc/R525CS3U] (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
129.
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enforceable way-by capping resale profits.
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